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THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

ENFORCEMENT OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS IN TRACT
DEVELOPMENTS
By

CARL CALLAWAY

Restrictive covenants are, in respect to property law in general, relatively
new. The problems and questions which can be encountered in working with
them can become quite complex. This is especially true in the case of tract
developments where a developer may subdivide a large tract of land into
building lots, anywhere from a few to several hundred, and sell them individually with restrictive covenants in each of the deeds. Among the problems
that most frequently arise is the age-old one of the running of covenants,
or to put it another way: Who can enforce the restrictive covenants against
whom? Two of the most important factors to consider in working out a
solution to this problem are (a) the relation in time in which the parties
acquired their lots and (b) the intent of the parties with respect to the binding
effect of the restrictions. In at least one theory of enforcement of these
restrictions there may also be a question as to notice by a subsequent purchaser of the existence of the covenant. A recent Connecticut case' illustrates
the obstacles which are encountered and must be overcome in order that all
of the lots in a tract may simultaneously enjoy the benefits and bear the
burdens of restrictive covenants. In that case a developer acquired a tract
of land by a deed which restricted its use to private residence purposes.
He then subdivided this tract into eight lots and eventually sold them all.
A map of the subdivision was recorded. The lots were conveyed by the
developer in the following order of time: The predecessor in title of plaintiff
Maganini acquired lot 2 in 1913. The predecessor in title of the defendant
Hodgson acquired lot 6 on July 12, 1915; and, shortly thereafter on July 29,
1915, the predecessor in title of plaintiff Maloney acquired lot 5. The deeds
to all lots contained substantially uniform restrictions that the lots were to
be used only for residence purposes, with only one residence on each lot, and
the lots were not to be subdivided further if the lots would then be less than
one acre in size. All of the lots were by municipal ordinance in an A-1 zone
for residence purposes which requires the lots be no smaller than one acre.
Defendant had no actual notice of the restrictions because they were not
contained or referred to in her deed. When she commenced extensive alterations of her garage, to convert it into a small private residence with the
intention of selling her main house and subdividing her lot into two lots
smaller than one acre each, the plaintiffs sought an injunction. Plaintiffs
alleged that their lots will be depreciated in value to the extent of $25,000

'Maganini et al. v. Hodgson, 82 A. 2d 801 (Conn., 1951).
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and $10,000, respectively. The trial court held that Maloney could enforce
the restrictions but that Maganini could not. Maganini and the defendant
both appealed. Upon appeal, it was held that Maganini could also enforce
the restrictions and that defendant was bound by the restrictions. The reasons
the trial court gave why Maganini could not enforce the covenant were that
(a) the restrictions in their deed varied from those in the other deeds so
Maganini's lot was not part of the tract development; and, (b) because his
lot was conveyed to him prior to the time of the conveyance of the defendant's
lot. The Supreme Court of Connecticut brushed aside reason (a), saying
the variance in the restrictions was more apparent than real,2 and thus
included the Maganini lot in the development. This is the most significant
thing in the opinion, because this change in conclusion takes all the vitality
out of reason (b). The relation in time of the conveyances ceases to have
any significance once the lots in question come within a tract development,
as the relation in time is not a factor in the theory on which tract development
restrictions are enforced. The court states' that it is true that the restrictions
can not be enforced by a prior grantee if the only evidence relied upon as a
ground for enforcing the restrictions is evidence from individual deeds
but that this principle is not true if a uniform plan of tract development is
found to exist. The court had concluded that there was a uniform plan of
development and therefore Maganini could enforce the restrictions. There
are several theories which are suggested to explain the enforcement of
restrictive covenants. 4 They are (1) the Contract theory; (2) the Equitable
Easement theory; (3) the Unjust Enrichment theory; and (4) what may be
called the Tract Development theory.
The Contract Theory
Under the first theory5 the law of contracts is applied as a basis for
enforcing the covenant between grantor and grantee 6 as to the use which the
grantee may make of the land conveyed to him. The covenant given by the
grantee in the deed is the expression of this contract and shows the intent
of the parties. The use of the land is the subject-matter of the contract. The
aId.,
at 804.
8
1d., at 804 to 805.
'For general reading on the subject and the various theories the following are recommended:

Clark, "Covenants and Interests Running With the Land" (2d ed., 1947) ; Reno, "The Enforcement
of Equitable Servitudes in Land," 28 Va. L. Rev. 951 (1942) ; Burby, "Land Burdens in California:
Equitable Land Burdens," 10 So. Calif. L. Rev. 281 (1937) ; McClintock on "Equity," at 336 to 357
(2d ed., 1948) ; Burby on "Real Property," 129 to 140 (1943) ; and also see annotations in 124 Am.
St. Rep. 128; 14 Ann. Cas. 1018; and 37 L. R. A. (n. s.) 12.

'For a discussion of this theory see Reno, "The Enforcement of Equitable Servitudes in Land,"

28 Va. L. Rev. 951 at 973 to 975 (1942).

'See Clark, "Covenants and Interests Running With the Land" (2d ed., 1947), at 172; and
Reno, "The Enforcement of Equitable Servitudes in Land," 28 Va. L. Rev. 951 at 952 to 953.
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contract creates a legal relationship between the parties! It is not an interest
in the land.' If equity does enforce restrictive covenants on this basis, it is
giving specific performance of a contract in relation to land. Contract law
allows the assignment of the benefit of the promise, or of the promise itself,
by the promisee.' ° Third party beneficiary contracts also allow a third party,
not an actual party to the contract to enforce the promise, when the contract
was entered into for his benefit. However, the right of the promisor to
transfer his obligation has never been recognized so as to make some third
party the primary obligor. The primary obligation always remains with
the promisor." Applying these contract principles to our problem we see
that while plaintiff Maganini might be entitled to enforce the promise on
the basis of an assignment to him of the promise or on the basis of being a
third party beneficiary, he could not enforce the promise against defendant
because he was not the promisor, but only a successor in interest to the
promisor with respect to the land. In such a case the promisor could not
assign or impose the obligation of the contract upon the defendant in the
absence of a novation or some new undertaking by the latter. 2 On the basis
of contract law defendant would be free of the restrictive covenant for lack
of "privity of contract." The contract theory then cannot explain the decision
of the Supreme Court.
The Equitable Easement Theory
Under the equitable easement theory 13 equity enforces the covenant in
much the same manner as easements at law are recognized and enforced. 4
Historically law courts refused to enforce restrictive covenants because they
were negative in character. 5 Equity assumed jurisdiction to fill the gap.' 6
The covenant in the deed runs from the grantee to the grantor and creates in
the grantor an'interest in the land conveyed which equity treats as an equitable
easement. The nature of the easement is the right of the grantor, who still
owns land to which the right attaches (the dominant tenement), to have the
'See Reno, "The Enforcement of Equitable Servitudes in Land," 28 Va. L. Rev. 951 at 961.
8
lbid.
'Id., at 973; and McClintock on "Equity," at 336 (2d ed., 1948).
"See Reno, "The Enforcement of Equitable Servitudes in Land," 28 Va. L. Rev. 951 at 952;
and also Corbin, "Assignment of Contract Rights," 74 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 207 (1926).
"See Corbin, "Assignment of Contract Rights," 74 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 207 at 216 (1926).
"But see Reno, "The Enforcement of Equitable Servitudes in Land," 28 Va. L. Rev. 951 at
1085 (1942), where he indicates the covenant could be enforced against a party, other than the
promisor, on the basis of an implied at law duty on all of the public not to interfere with the
covenant.
"For a discussion of this theory see Reno, "The Enforcement of Equitable Servitudes in Land,"
28 Va. L. Rev. 951 at 975 to 979 (1942).
"Id., at 973.
"Burby on "Real Property," at 129 (1943).
""Ibid.
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grantee-covenantor's land (the servient tenement) not used for certain
purposes. There is a duty on the owner of the servient land not to interfere
with the right held by the owner of the dominant tenement. This means that
at the time of conveyance of the first lot a right is created in all remaining
lots as they are the dominant tenement. The right being appurtenant to those
lots, it passes with each lot as it is conveyed, 1" and thus each owner of the
later conveyed lots has an easement in the first lot conveyed. The easements
in the later conveyed lots are not created till they are conveyed, so the dominant estate, as to these later conveyed lots, will not include the lot first
conveyed. The prior grantee will have no easement in lots later conveyed
as there is "no privity of estate."'" This situation could be corrected by the
grantor conveying to the first grantee, and all prior grantees, an easement
in the lands retained by the grantor. This could probably be done by a covenant by the grantor to restrict the use of the land remaining in his possession.
Where this is done it can be said that mutual reciprocal easements are
created.'" By doing this the grantor makes the retained land a servient
tenement and the land granted becomes a dominant tenement. This should
be done in express terms in the deed as easements are implied at law only
in case of strict necessity." Applying this analysis to our facts there could
be no dominant tenement held by Maganini because his land was conveyed
prior to the defendant's. This theory then does not explain the enforcement
of the covenant in the Connecticut case unless the deeds clearly contain
mutual reciprocal easements. In the absence of express mutual reciprocal
easements, if this theory actually was relied upon by the court it must be
that equity in adopting the legal theory of easements, also implies mutual
reciprocal easements where they wouldn't be implied at law. That may be
what the court is doing by implication when it finds the Maganini lot is part
of a uniform plan. It is more likely, however, that the trial court was
relying on this theory in denying Maganini relief after finding his lot was
not part of the development.
The Unjust Enrichment Theory
The unjust enrichment theory originated with the case of Tulk v.
Moxhay,2 ' the first case in which a restrictive covenant was enforced. The
theory is that the grantor conveys the land to the grantee in consideration for
"'See Reno, "The Enforcement of Equitable Servitudes in Land," 28 Va. L. Rev. 951 at 977 to
978 (1942).
16
Id., at 975 to 979.
"°See Burby on "Real Property," at 134 to 137; and McClintock on "Equity," at 341 to 344
(2d ed., 1948).
"See Burby on "Real Property," at 85.
12 Phillips 774,41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (High Ct. of Ch., 1848).
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a lower purchase price plus the covenant from the grantee that he will restrict
his use of the land. This covenant is a contract, 22 and as we have seen, it
would only be enforceable against the covenantor because the obligation of
the contract is not assignable. So the covenantor could convey the land to
a third person who would take the land free of the restriction. According
to this theory the covenantor would get a higher price for the land free of
the restriction. The result would be the covenantee could not enforce the
restriction, and the covenantor would make a profit on the transaction. This
would be unjust and inequitable to the grantor. So equity took jurisdiction
to enforce the restriction against any third party who purchased the land
with notice of the restriction. Under this theory, notice to the purchaser is
important, and the intent of such a purchaser as to whether he considers
himself bound by the covenant or not would seem to have very little to do
with the enforcement of the covenant. This theory, in effect, creates an
equitable interest in the grantor in the land conveyed which the grantor or
his assigns can enforce.23 This equitable interest, however, can be cut off
24
by the sale of the land to a bona fide purchaser for value without notice.
In the Connecticut case, assuming adequate notice, both plaintiffs could
enforce the covenant, as the promise could be assigned, and the defendant
would be bound by the covenant by reason of taking the land with notice.
Constructive notice is all that is required. There is one criticism of this
theory. That is that the land is probably worth more with the covenant on
it than it is without the covenant. This is true at least as to those purchasers
who will pay a premium to get a home or lot in pleasant surroundings with
the assurance that the area will be kept that way. Notice that in this Connecticut case the value of both of the plaintiffs' land will depreciate if the
covenant is not enforced. This fact substantiates the criticism and shows
the reason given for this theory isn't present there.
The Tract Development Theory
Any one of the foregoing theories may explain why a restrictive covenant is enforceable or not enforceable in a particular situation. They are the
theories relied upon in the absence of a tract development, which is a special
fact situation. The problem in the Connecticut case arises out of a tract
development and the court is relying upon a new theory which could be called
the tract development theory. That this is the theory relied upon by the
Supreme Court is apparent from the general rule the court states : 5 that
"See Reno, "The Enforcement of Equitable Servitudes in Land," 28 Va. L. Rev. 951 at 971
(1942).
-'Ibid.
"See McClintock on "Equity," at 336.
"Maganini et al. v. Hodgson, supra, note 1, at 804.
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where there is a general scheme of development whereby a tract of land is
divided into lots which are sold by deeds containing substantially uniform
restriction then-any grantee may enforce the restrictions against any other
grantee. To support this statement the court cites several cases, including
De Gray v. Monmouth Beach Club House Co.26 That case is the leading case
on this theory and is cited by a multitude of cases throughout the United
States. An analysis of the rule set out in the De Gray case is in order for
the purpose of comparing this theory with the others. The essential elements
of the rule2" can be arranged as follows:
1. There must be a general scheme or plan of development adopted and made
public by the developer.
2. That plan must contemplate a restriction as to the uses to which the buildings or lots may be put, such restrictions being put in a covenant inserted
in each deed to a purchaser.
3. It must appear by the writings or surrounding circumstances that the
restrictions on each lot are intended for the benefit of all the other lots,
and that each purchaser is to have the benefit of and be subject to the
restrictions.
4. If the above elements are present then any purchaser and his assigns may
enforce the covenant against any other purchaser and his assigns if the
latter purchaser bought with knowledge of the scheme and the covenant was
part of the subject matter of his purchase.
The court in the De Gray case indicates2" that it is enforcing an "equity"
which it says seems to spring from a presumption that each purchaser paid
an enhanced price for his land in reliance upon the carrying out of the plan
or scheme, and that while one purchaser is bound by and observes the covenant it would be inequitable to allow any other purchaser in the tract to
violate the covenant. This presumption is just the reverse of the unjust
enrichment theory but it achieves the same result by creating a situation in
which equity will act to prevent injustice. This theory probably rests upon
a policy idea that it is in the public interest to foster the development of
pleasant, quiet and healthy residential areas by private means. If this is
true then the court is enforcing the plan or scheme 9 more than it is enforcing
a covenant, or a contract, or an interest in land. If the courts are acting
according to the policy above suggested then this theory parallels very closely
the development of zoning ordinances which are based upon an exercise of
2050

N. J. Eq. 329, 24 A. 388 (1892), affirmed 67 N. J. Eq. 731, 63 A. 1118 (1904).

"Id., at 340.

"Id., at 339.
-"In Schmidt v. Palisade Supply Co. et al., 84 A. 807 (Ct. of Ch. of N. J., 1912) a tract development, the restrictions were enforced against purchasers of land ostensibly within the development
but not actually owned by the developer at the time of the conveyances to the plaintiffs. The
developer later acquired the defendant's land, subdivided it, conveying to defendants. The implication of this would seem to be the court was enforcing the scheme or plan advertised rather than
enforcing the restrictions on some other recognized basis.
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the state's police power to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the community. Applying this theory to the Connecticut case, it is easy to see why
plaintiff Maganini was properly allowed to enforce the restriction once the
court determined that his lot is within the tract development.
California3" recognizes the tract development theory but does not follow
it to the same extent as the De Gray case. The leading case in California is
Werner v. Graham. 1 That case was a suit to quiet title to land as to restrictions expressed in plaintiff's deed. The defendants were all owners of land
in the same tract. The land had been divided by a developer into more than
100 lots. A map had been recorded, but it did not include a declaration of
restrictions. The deeds, however, all contained uniform restrictions as to the
use of each lot, clearly indicating a general scheme of development. The
developer orally representd to each purchaser that he was exacting the same
restrictions from all purchasers. The developer had given plaintiff a quitclaim deed of any interest he had retained in plaintiff's land while 16 lots
were still left unconveyed by the developer. The defendants were in three
groups. First, prior purchasers to plaintiff; second, those who purchased
after plaintiff, but before the developer had given plaintiff the quitclaim
deed; and third, the purchasers of the 16 lots. The trial court had held the
plaintiff was bound by the restrictions, but the Supreme Court of California
held he was free of the restrictions as to all of the defendants. The reasoning
of the court was that as to the first group, the prior purchasers, there was no
privity of contract nor privity of estate. As to the third group the court said
the developer had released any interest he had held in respect to those 16
lots, so their purchasers got no interest. As to the second group, the court
treated it on the basis of a possible tract development and held there could
be no enforcement on that basis either. The court said32 that to have an
enforceable restriction there must be, in the deed itself, a clear expression
of the intent of both the grantor and the grantee to restrict the lot conveyed
as part of a general scheme or plan. The court said it would look only to the
deed, or a declaration of restrictions recorded and made part of the deed
by reference, in ascertaining the mutual intent of the parties, and the existence
of a common scheme or development. Here lies the main difference between
the Werner case and the De Gray case. In the latter the court can look to surrounding circumstances in determining whether there was a common scheme
of development. The California court in the Werner case also indicates there
must be a clear showing in the deed of what land is intended as the dominant
"0 See Burby, "Land Burdens in California: Equitable Land Burdens," 10 So. Calif. L. Rev. 281
(1937).
" 181 Cal. 174, 183 P. 945 (1919).
32-Id., at 182.
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tenement. In short, California is strict on requiring full written evidence
of the plan and the intent of the parties, on the basis of the Werner case. The
De Gray case is more liberal in allowing evidence of the plan and of the
intent of the parties to be taken from the circumstances. The intent referred
to means what the parties had in mind as to whether the covenant is to be
a burden upon, and a benefit to every lot sold in the tract, not only in the
hands of the first purchaser, but also in the hands of subsequent owners.
California still follows the rule of the Werner case that the deed is the only
evidence of what the parties have done. 3
The problem we have discussed in the Connecticut case probably would
not be decided the same in California. While the report does not give sufficient facts to tell whether California requirements would be satisfied, it does
not appear that such information was present in the'deeds because the court
decided the Maganini lot was within the tract merely because there was no
substantial variation in the covenants in the deeds.

"Robertson v. Nichols, 92 Cal. App. 2d 201, at 206, 206 P. 2d 898 (1949).

